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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Ashley Lynne Sanquist appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, concealing evidence, and petit theft. Specifically, she challenges the
denial of her motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Officers were dispatched to a bail bond company when employees reported two
people in a car outside who were making them uncomfortable. (P.H. Tr., p. 7, L. 23 – p.
9, L. 22; p. 48, L. 18 – p. 49, L. 21.) The car belonged to someone who had just been
arrested. (P.H. Tr., p. 11, L. 20 – p. 12, L. 2.) Officers approached the car, tapped on the
window, and contacted the occupants. (P.H. Tr., p. 9, L. 24 – p. 10, L. 9.) One of the
persons verbally identified herself as Ashley Sanquist. (P.H. Tr., p. 10, L. 10 – p. 11, L.
2.) The other person was in fact Jennifer Arnold. (P.H. Tr., p. 11, Ls. 3-9.) Both Sanquist
and Arnold provided a false name for Arnold (Arnold said her name was Jacqueline Bulgar
and Sanquist said Arnold was Jacqueline Bruss). (P.H. Tr., p. 11, Ls. 10-11; p. 41, L. 19 –
p. 42, L. 10; Defense Exhibit A (1180013.avi at 03:54-4:57).) Officers were later able to
identify Arnold and learned she had an outstanding warrant for her arrest. (P.H. Tr., p. 42,
L. 16 – p. 43, L. 3.)
Sanquist stated they were waiting in the car to stay out of the rain until a ride came.
(P.H. Tr., p. 43, Ls. 13-23.) Sanquist claimed she and Arnold (“Jacqueline Bruss”) had
been given permission to be in the car by Tiffany. (P.H. Tr., p. 13, Ls. 19-22; p. 43, L. 24
– p. 44, L. 7.) Officer Cannon contacted Tiffany who stated that she had given them
permission to be in the car, that she was not the titled owner of the car (that was her
1

boyfriend who had been arrested), and gave officers permission to search the car. (P.H.
Tr., p. 13, L. 23 – p. 14, L. 15; p. 36, L. 14 – p. 37, L. 25; p. 44, L. 8 – p. 46, L. 7.) As
directed by officers, Sanquist and Arnold sat on a bench, under an awning, approximately
50 feet from the car while officers searched the car. (P.H. Tr., p. 50, L. 20 – p. 51, L. 7.)
Inside the car officers found suspected contraband, drug paraphernalia, and stolen property.
(P.H. Tr., p. 14, Ls. 23-25.)
As Sanquist waited, she dropped a bindle and then stepped on it. (P.H. Tr., p. 51,
L. 10 – p. 53, L. 7.) When officers later had her stand up they recovered the bindle of
methamphetamine from the ground. (P.H. Tr., p. 18, L. 18 – p. 19, L. 6; p. 23, L. 20 – p.
26, L. 9; p. 53, L. 8 – p. 54, L. 5.)
The state charged Sanquist with possession of methamphetamine, concealing
evidence, and petit theft by possession of stolen property. (R., pp. 69-70.) She moved to
suppress evidence. (R,. pp. 76-79.) The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R.,
p. 87.) The court reasoned that officers properly contacted Arnold and Sanquist and
learned their identities. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 7-24.) The officers then developed
reasonable suspicion and probable cause that they had been provided a false name for
Arnold. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 27, L. 4 – p., 28, L. 7.) Sanquist then pled guilty, preserving her
right to appeal the denial of her suppression motion. (2/1/17 Tr., p. 2, Ls. 6-24; R., pp. 8892.) Sanquist filed an appeal timely from entry of judgment. (R., pp. 99, 105.)
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ISSUE
Sanquist states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred by denying Ms. Sanquist’s motion to
suppress the evidence discovered as a result of an unlawfully-extended [sic]
detention.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Sanquist failed to show error in the district court’s finding of reasonable
suspicion to detain her?

3

ARGUMENT
Sanquist Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Finding Of Reasonable
Suspicion To Detain Her
A.

Introduction
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., p. 87.) Part of the court’s

reasoning was that officers developed reasonable suspicion, and later probable cause, to
believe Sanquist had provided a false name for Arnold. (1/23/17 Tr., p. 27, L. 4 – p. 28, L.
7.)

Sanquist argues that the officers had neither reasonable suspicion nor probable

cause because giving “a deliberately-false [sic] response to a police officer’s questions” is
not a crime. (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, it is not
preserved. Second, if addressed on the merits, it is without legal basis.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the

appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,
207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133,
135 (2005)). The appellate court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous, but will freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional
principles and determinations of reasonable suspicion, in light of the facts found. Purdum,
147 Idaho at 207, 207 P.3d at 183 (citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739,
741 (2007)), State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 127, 233 P.3d 52, 58 (2010).
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C.

Sanquist Did Not Preserve Her Argument That Reasonable Suspicion She Provided
A False Name Did Not Provide A Legal Basis For Her Detention
“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the

parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.”
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (internal quotation
and citation omitted). Review of the record shows Sanquist never presented in the district
court below a theory that providing a false name to officers did not justify a detention
because the act of providing a false name was legal activity. Sanquist is improperly trying
to raise this theory for the first time on appeal.
Sanquist moved to “suppress the drugs found under the Defendant’s foot because
the discovery was the fruit of a detention that had become illegal due to its duration
exceeding any legal cause therefor.” (R., p. 76; see also R., p. 79.) The state responded,
in part, by arguing that evidence Sanquist provided a false name for Arnold provided
reasonable suspicion Sanquist violated I.C. §§ 18-705 and 18-5413(2). (Aug., pp. 2-3;
1/23/17 Tr., p. 22, L. 7 – p. 23, L. 2.) Sanquist’s response to the state’s argument was that
“the police didn’t know she was giving a false name until the illegal search of the purses
and then they get an I.D.” (1/23/17 Tr., p. 24, L. 11 – p. 25, L. 6.) At no point did Sanquist
argue that reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that Sanquist had provided a
false name for Arnold did not create a legal basis for detaining her.
Because Sanquist did not present the theory that her activity of providing a false
name to officers was legal and therefore could not provide justification for a seizure to the
district court, it is not preserved for appeal.
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D.

Even If This Court Should Reach The Merits Of The Argument Sanquist Has
Shown No Error
Even if preserved, Sanquist’s theory that she could not be detained upon suspicion

of providing a false name because such activity is legal is meritless. An investigative
detention is a seizure of limited duration to investigate suspected criminal activity and does
not offend the Fourth Amendment if the facts available to the officer at the time gave rise
to reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot. State v. Stewart, 145
Idaho 641, 644, 181 P.3d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)). “The justification for an investigative detention is evaluated upon the totality of
the circumstances then known to the officer.” State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88
P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
Evidence sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion is “less than that necessary to
establish probable cause” but requires “more than a mere hunch.” State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).
Here the record establishes that officers had at least reasonable suspicion that
Sanquist had provided a false name for Arnold. Arnold said her name was Jacqueline
Bulgar. (Defense Exhibit A (1179971.avi at 00:36-01:20).) She had unusual difficulty
remembering her date of birth.

(Defense Exhibit A (1179971.avi at 00:50-01:18).)

Sanquist said Arnold was Jacqueline Bruss. (Defense Exhibit A (1180013.avi at 03:544:57).) Although there was a return on the name “Jacqueline Bulgar,” the officers noted
that Sanquist had given a different last name (“Bruss”) for Arnold. (Defense Exhibit A
(1180013.avi at 05:00-05:20; 1179971.avi at 02:15-03:56).) So one of the officers decided
to check on the computer. (Defense Exhibit A (1179971.avi at 03:44-06:02).) The officer
then confronted Arnold because she did not look like the booking photo for Jacqueline
6

Bulgar and did not have Jacqueline Bulgar’s tattoos as shown in her arrest records.
(Defense Exhibit A (1179971.avi at 06:02-07:46).) In addition, the second officer, who
had interacted primarily with Sanquist, checked “Bruss” in the records without apparent
success. (Defense Exhibit A (1180013.avi at 07:55-08:47).) This evidence established
reasonable suspicion that Sanquist had provided a false name for Arnold.
Sanquist’s attempt to mislead the officers about Arnold’s identity did create
reasonable suspicion that she was violating, or attempting to violate, I.C. §§ 18-705 and
18-5413(2). The former makes it illegal to “delay[] or obstruct[] any public officer, in the
discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office.” I.C. § 18-705. As found by
the district court, it was “reasonable for the police to be present at the bail bonds parking
lot and determine who are the people in this car” and “the officers have a right to inquire
as to who remains in the car.” (1/23/17 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 9-25.) Certainly the false name
delayed and obstructed them in their efforts to learn who the people in the car were.
The latter makes it a crime when a person “knowingly gives or causes to be given
false information regarding his or another’s identity to any law enforcement officer
investigating the commission of an offense.” I.C. § 18-5413(2). Here there were several
potential offenses being investigated, including the offense related to the warrant for
Arnold’s arrest, and Sanquist undoubtedly provided false information about Arnold’s
identity.
Sanquist, relying on State v. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885, 888, 908 P.2d 578, 581
(Ct. App. 1995), argues that her false statement regarding Arnold’s identity “made while
the officer is not already investigating the commission of a crime” and without an
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obligation “to give an answer,” is not a crime. (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) This argument
does not withstand analysis.
The reasoning of the Brandstetter court was as follows:
Here, we believe it is doubtful that Brandstetter can be said to have
hampered police officials in the exercise of their duties by falsely
responding to a question which he was not legally obligated to answer. His
deliberate falsification was no more obstructive than would have been his
silence. Because Brandstetter could have remained silent when questioned
by the law enforcement officials, his unsworn oral misstatement cannot be
said to have increased the officers’ burden, on the facts presented here.
127 Idaho at 888, 908 P.2d at 581. 1 The facts of this case, however, show at least
reasonable suspicion that Sanquist’s false statement of Arnold’s identity obstructed or
delayed officers, that the statement was at least an attempt to obstruct or delay officers, or
that it aided and abetted Arnold’s obstruction and delaying of officers. Officers specifically
spent time investigating whether Arnold was Jacqueline Bulgar and also investigating
whether she was Jacqueline Bruss. (Defense Exhibit A (1179971.avi at 03:44-07:46;
1180013.avi at 07:55-08:47).)

Because the officers had to affirmatively investigate

whether Arnold was Jacqueline Bruss, an investigation unnecessary but for Sanquist’s lie,
officers had reasonable suspicion or even probable cause to believe they had been
obstructed and delayed by Sanquist’s lie.

1

The state submits that the logic and holding of Brandstetter is no longer viable. The Court
in Brandstetter relied in part of the doctrine of “exculpatory no” (the idea that merely
denying committing a crime is allowed by the Fifth Amendment right against compelled
self-incrimination). Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 886, 908 P.2d at 579. The Supreme Court
of the United States, however, rejected the concept of the “exculpatory no” after
Brandstetter was decided. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998). The correct
analysis is therefore not a comparison of what would have happened had the defendant
actually invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against what she actually did, but rather
whether what she did was reasonably suspected to be obstruction or delay, or was an
attempt to obstruct or delay, or aided and abetted Arnold’s obstruction and delaying.
8

Even more damning of Sanquist’s argument is that the state had no obligation to
show exactly what crime was reasonably suspected. Reasonable suspicion “does not
require a belief that any specific criminal activity is afoot to justify an investigative
detention; instead, all that is required is a showing of objective and specific articulable facts
giving reason to believe that the individual has been or is about to be involved in some
criminal activity.” State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 615, 329 P.3d 391, 397 (Ct. App.
2014) (emphasis original). In addition, “innocent acts, when considered together, can be
sufficiently suspicious so as to justify an investigative detention.” State v. Neal, 159 Idaho
919, ___, 367 P.3d 1231, 1237 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 9-10 (1989)).
This standard has been applied to justify detention for facially legal conduct when
it gives rise to reasonable suspicion. For example, flight may rise to the level of creating
reasonable suspicion even though officers do not know what specific crime prompted the
suspect to flee. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). Under the circumstances
of this case it was reasonable for officers to suspect that providing false identification for
Arnold was an indication that Sanquist and Arnold were involved in some criminal activity
that they hoped to prevent police from discovering. Providing the false names in this case
was as suspicious of criminal activity as the flight in Neal, even if the crime Sanquist was
trying to cover up was not known to the officers at the time of the false statement.
Sanquist also argues that “the officers did not know the information was false until
after they arrested Ms. Sanquist’s companion and found her identification” and “[a]t the
critical moment—the point at which the officers extended the detention of Ms. Sanquist
and her companion—the only information the officers knew was that the police database
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corroborated the information they had been given.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9 (emphasis
original).) This claim is both legally irrelevant and false. It is legally irrelevant because
officers did not have to know Sanquist had provided a false name, they only had to have
reasonable suspicion that she was or was about to be involved in some criminal activity.
The argument is false because the police database at no time corroborated the name of
“Jacqueline Bruss” given by Sanquist. What the officers knew was that dispatch had
returned on the name “Jacqueline Bulgar,” as provided by Arnold, but they also knew at
the time dispatch returned that Arnold and Sanquist had both denied having any
identification on them; Arnold had great difficulty remembering “Jacqueline Bulgar’s”
date of birth; and that Sanquist had claimed Arnold’s name was “Jacqueline Bruss.”
(Defendant’s Exhibit A (1179971.avi:46; 1180013.avi).) The argument that the return on
the name of Jacqueline Bulgar eliminated reasonable suspicion that Sanquist was providing
a false name to avoid detection of criminal activity is meritless under a complete review of
the facts of this case.
Arnold and Sanquist both gave different false names for Arnold. The district court
properly concluded that the officers reasonably suspected, and then developed probable
cause, to believe that Arnold “isn’t the person who the defendant in this case says Arnold
is” and so had “probable cause to believe that a crime’s been committed.” (1/23/17 Tr., p.
27, Ls. 3-17.) Sanquist has failed to show error in this determination.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 13th day of February, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of February, 2018, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic
copy to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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